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Abstract 
Despite a significant amount of research, literature continues to produce contrasting 
predictions on how, and when, public bureaucracies may enhance or constrain policy 
effectiveness. On the one hand, developmental state research has stressed the importance of 
bureaucrats’ autonomy from politics, particularly in emerging economies. On the other hand, 
public choice literature has called for strong oversight by politicians over the bureaus. The 
paper contributes to this debate by analysing Turkey’s contemporary public investment 
management. It offers a detailed exploration of how economic bureaucracy’s characteristics 
contributed to ‘sound’ investment management. The analysis draws on in-depth elite 
interviews. The results suggest that the existence of a capable and authoritative organisation 
directing the project cycle has positively contributed to the technical management of 
investments. Empirical evidence also indicates that this organisation is insufficiently 
insulated vis-à-vis government; its ability to implement ‘sound’ policies is therefore 
contingent on the political context. Nevertheless, the analysis also uncovers significant 
resistance of the bureaucrats against measures which would increase bureaucratic efficiency 
and transparency. Overall, the findings suggest that bureaucratic autonomy and 
accountability play an equally relevant role in determining policy effectiveness. 
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Do bureaucracies enhance or constrain policy 
effectiveness? Evidence from Turkey’s 
central management of public investment  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Like in many other countries around the world, the use of public monies in 
Turkey has been frequently distorted by populism, clientelism, and policies 
driven by short-term electoral interests rather than long-term developmental 
goals (cf. Heper & Keyman, 1998; Kalaycıoğlu, 2001). Yet, recent research on 
the allocation of Turkish public investment during the last decade has 
uncovered a picture in which the geographical distribution of public goods 
responds more to socioeconomic need than distributive politics 
considerations (Luca and Rodríguez-Pose, 2015). The current paper aims to 
understand this empirical puzzle by: (1) exploring in more depth whether 
Turkey’s public investment project cycle is currently managed effectively. We 
define policy effectiveness as the ability to formulate and pursue objectives 
coherently with their policy mandate, regardless of the preferences of other 
actors in their environment (Echeverri-Gent, 1992); (2) explaining what is the 
role played by the Ministry of Development – the organisation in charge of 
investment allocation and overall coordination – in ensuring that investment 
decisions remain focused on publicly-oriented goals, as opposed to purely 
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becoming a tool for particularistic redistribution and rewarding electoral 
support (Biddle, Milor, 1995).1  
 
The research goal is inspired by the literature on state effectiveness which, 
after almost a century since Max Weber (1921)’s seminal work on 
bureaucracies, still discusses how, and when, public sector organisations can 
contribute to the effective provision of essential public goods. On the one 
hand, the literature on the developmental state (Amsden, 1989; Evans, 1995; 
Evans et al., 2014; Rauch & Evans, 1999; Wade, 1990) has pointed out how 
capable and insulated bureaucracies are important preconditions for the 
sound management of development, particularly in contexts where the 
political class is prone to short-term, populist decision-making and 
clientelistic redistributive goals. On the other hand, however, the public 
choice literature (Huber & Shipan, 2001; Huber, Shipan, & Pfahler, 2001; 
Niskanen, 1971, 2001) has stressed the inherent self-interested nature of 
bureaucratic agents, and hence emphasised the importance of mechanisms 
aimed at ensuring oversight over bureaucrats to avoid the latter’s potential 
predatory and rent-seeking behaviours.   
 
This contribution draws on elite, semi-structured interviews among Turkey’s 
economic bureaucracy, as well as on the analysis of national and international 
policy documents. To the best of our knowledge, the analysis is the first 
attempt to critically explore the micro-foundations of the Turkish public 
investment project cycle. The article first contributes to the literature on 
distributive politics (cf. Golden & Min, 2013) by providing novel insights on 
how dynamics of tactical redistribution in contemporary Turkey are 
                                                 
1 In the real world, the distinction between the two ideal types may be blurred, in the sense that 
policies might be aimed at electoral rewarding and yet address social objectives. Like any ideal-
type, the depiction of the two policy objectives as completely dichotomous is hence a heuristic 
device.   
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concretely shaped. Understanding the functioning and the potential 
bottlenecks in the country’s public investment cycle is particularly relevant in 
the context of EU accession negotiations. More broadly, the article contributes 
to the debate on how to achieve and foster state capacity in emerging and 
middle-income countries similar to Turkey. It does so by identifying the 
specific institutional characteristics which promoted/inhibited the effective 
management of the investment project cycle in the Turkish case.  
 
Results suggest that the institutional characteristics of the Ministry of 
Development – comparatively more capable and authoritative than most 
other bureaucratic agencies in the country – have positively contributed to a 
technical management of investment projects. Results also show, however, 
how the organisation is insufficiently insulated vis-à-vis the government. The 
effective management of funds is hence strongly dependent on the political 
elite’s ‘will to deliver’. Luca and Rodríguez-Pose's (2015) results showing 
limited pork-barrelling allocations must be interpreted as contingent to the 
government willingness to follow the ‘good governance’ reforms 
implemented after the 2001 economic crisis and also triggered by the EU 
accession negotiations (Özdemir-Tsarouhas, 2013). In comparison, in periods 
such as the 1990s, when the political system was in a state of flux (Sayarı, 
2002), the bureaucracy was unable to shield from pressure and deliver. Such 
results confirm the literature on developmental states, which emphasizes the 
existence of strong and autonomous bureaucracies as a key precondition for 
sound policies. At the same time, however, the analysis also uncovers 
significant resistance from groups within the organisation against the 
implementation of reforms aimed at increasing bureaucratic efficiency and 
transparency. Overall, in line with very recent international research on state 
effectiveness (cf. Azulai et al., 2014), findings hence suggest that, to foster 
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policy-effectiveness, bureaucracies must be not only capable and insulated, 
but also accountable.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: section two provides a 
review of the literature, and draws from it the main research hypotheses. 
Section three offers an overview of Turkey’s state and policy effectiveness 
tradition, while section four discusses the methodology. Section five presents 
the empirical findings. Section six eventually leads the discussion to a 
conclusion. 
 
 
2. The role of bureaucracies in fostering state 
effectiveness: literature review and research hypotheses 
 
The presence of a well-functioning public sector able to deliver effective 
policies is a key precondition to foster economic growth and social 
transformation (Azulai et al., 2014).2 Effectiveness depends on the existence of 
a technical project cycle, that is mechanisms allowing to translate visions and 
goals into well-informed, disciplined, and accountable decisions (Milio, 2007; 
World Bank, 1997). Yet, while there is universal agreement on the importance 
of technical capacity, debate still exists on which institutional conditions are 
                                                 
2 Empirically, we interpret effectiveness as the extent to which the allocation of public 
investment remains focused on the publicly oriented goals of increasing the overall national 
welfare and/or reducing the inter-regional disparities in people’s income and capabilities, as 
opposed to becoming a tool used for short-term, purely strategic purposes (Biddle, Milor, 1995). 
Given the scope of the paper, we do not discuss in depth whether there exist – or not – a trade-off 
between favouring overall national efficiency and reducing inter-regional imbalances, an issue at 
the centre of much disagreement among the regional science literature (Farole, Rodríguez-Pose, 
& Storper, 2011; Martin, 2008; Osberg, 1995; World Bank, 2009). Our choice is motivated by the 
fact that, although grounded in different policy preferences, both objectives are not driven by 
short-term strategic rationales but by long-term policy objectives. 
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necessary to ensure that such technical management measures are concretely 
implemented and followed. Too frequently, the effective geographical 
allocation and management of key public services and goods fails because of 
distorted bureaucratic and political incentives (Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez, & 
Magaloni, 2012). These concerns are particularly relevant in the developing 
world where, because of weaker societal institutions, the provision of public 
goods is more likely to be distorted around redistributive goals and 
clientelistic networks aimed at pleasing partisan supporters in the short-term 
(Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, & Weingast, 2007; Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2012; 
Knutsen, 2013). Drawing from the case of Turkey, Kalayıcıoğlu has 
underlined how 
 
[it] is an irony to note that the practice of popular government 
[electoral democracy, A./N.] and good governance seem to be inversely 
related […] Hence, in effect, democracy is equated with populism 
practiced through clientelistic networks, which often requires the 
bending of rules and laws to distribute benefits […] Promotion of 
patronage undermines law enforcement and erodes the rule of law in 
the country. Hence a dilemma emerges: democracy is maintained at 
the expenses of the rule of law (Kalaycıoğlu, 2001, p. 66, 67, 63).  
 
In the cases of Thailand and Indonesia, after the shift to democracy politicians 
used their control of the legislature and the prime minister’s office, as well as 
pork-barrelling spending in the countryside, to build their own patron-client 
networks (Rock, 2009). Exploring the experience of Thailand, Rock argues that 
politicians “did so by carrying out a frontal and corrupt assault on the state so 
they could reward their supporters and build their coffers for the next 
election” (ibid., p. 941). Electoral politics is inherently particularistic, in the 
sense that the exchange of votes and other types of political support in favour 
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of public decisions with divisible benefits spans virtually across all political 
systems (Piattoni, 2001). Yet, in ‘weak democracies’ such particularistic 
behaviours may end up in ‘tragic underdevelopment equilibria’ where voters 
contribute maintaining in power political coalitions whose actions are 
detrimental for the overall societal development (Blaydes, 2010; Diaz-Cayeros 
et al., 2007).  
 
The literature tradition rooted in economic sociology and international 
development has hence stressed how capable bureaucracies insulated from 
politicians may be beneficial for effective policy-making. The existence of 
such bureaucracies may keep the state and its developmental policies at bay 
from interest groups, as well as from politicians’ short-term objectives. The 
literature on the developmental state provides one of the strongest positions 
of how ‘Weberian’ state structures may be a prerequisite for ensuring 
effective policymaking aimed at fostering economic growth in emerging 
economies (Amsden, 1989; Evans et al., 2014; Moon & Prasad, 1994; Rauch & 
Evans, 1999; Wade, 1990). The comparative ‘developmental advantage’ of 
rational, technocratic structures lies in their intrinsic strength in designing 
and carrying out developmental policies which are politically difficult but 
critically important (Eisner, 1993). If the bureaucracy is strong and have 
enough autonomy to resist political pressure and interferences by rent-
seeking actors, it will be more able to promote development and formulate 
policies in the public interest.  
 
Drawing from such literature our first hypothesis is that, conditional on the 
existence of technical capacity, policy effectiveness is positively related to the 
extent to which the economic bureaucracy enjoys insulation from external 
actors.  
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Rauch and Evans (1999) in particular suggest how insulation depends on 
some key ‘Weberian features’, namely meritocratic recruitment, salary 
competitiveness with respect to other civil services and the private sector, 
internal promotion, and career stability. They also provide cross-country 
empirical evidence showing how the link between differential government 
performance and economic growth across the world is significantly correlated 
to the existence of bureaucracies with the features described above. Analysing 
the relationship between political appointees within the bureaucracy and 
management performance, Lewis (2007) shows that US federal programmes 
administered by politically appointed bureau chiefs received systematically 
lower evaluation scores than programmes run by chiefs from the civil service. 
Rasul and Rogger (2013) further demonstrate that public sector project 
completion rates in Nigeria are positively correlated with bureaucrats’ 
autonomy.  
 
Overall, Evans (1995) argues that developmental states are those where a 
strong bureaucracy is embedded enough in society to ensure that the state 
elite is aware of and responsive to societal needs, but at the same time 
independent enough to be protected against interferences from special 
interest groups and politicians. While Evans (1995)’s theory provides 
important insights into the relations between bureaucracies and their external, 
social environment, his argument still leaves open questions on the specific 
extent to which bureaucratic agencies’ should be insulated from democratic 
politics.3  
 
                                                 
3 Interestingly, while most of the literature has taken a positive view of developmental states, 
Kohli (2004) rightly stresses how a country such as South Korea – one of the most discussed 
examples of effective developmental states – has been characterized by cohesive politics, i.e. “by 
centralised and purposive authority structures that often penetrate deep into the society” (p. 10) 
to the extent that it shared characteristics with fascist states of interwar Europe and Japan. 
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The literature stemming from the public choice tradition has indeed put the 
mechanisms to control the bureaucracy at the core of its interest. Stressing the 
inherent self-interested nature of bureaucratic agents, such research points to 
the role played by mechanisms aimed at ensuring control over bureaucrats as 
a key factor to avoid their possible predatory and rent-seeking behaviours 
(Chang, de Figueiredo, Weingast, & Weingast, 2001; Huber & Shipan, 2001; 
Niskanen, 2001). As Downs (1967) and Niskanen (1971)’s seminal works on 
bureaucracy go, in the absence of control self-interested and rational 
bureaucrats will try to maximize their own utility and act in defiance of the 
public interest. Bureaucratic performance is hence explained following a 
principal-agent model, according to which a principal (the legislator) acts as 
an outside monitor and can reduce inefficiencies and improve delivery of 
services by controlling the opportunistic behaviours of his bureaucratic agent 
(Huber et al., 2001; Niskanen, 2001).  
 
Successive scholars have further developed such argument to account for 
more complex conditions and considered the possibility that there may be 
multiple principals (Olsen, 2015). The literature explores cases where the 
room of action of the bureaucracy may be shaped not only by legislators but 
also by interest groups (e.g. Banks & Weingast, 1992; Bendor & Moe, 1985; 
Waller & Walsh, 1996) and by individual influential veto players (e.g. Moraski 
& Shipan, 1999). The overall argument is however clear: bureaucrats are 
modelled as interested in “some combination of bigger budgets, more slack, 
achieving policy goals, and avoiding oversight” (Bendor & Moe, 1985, p. 757). 
In the absence of control by politicians, bureaucracies will work against the 
interest of society, as “the very expertise that bureaucrats and other actors 
enjoy, along with their structural role in policy processes, provides them with 
opportunities to work against the interest of politicians and their supporters” 
(Huber & Shipan, 2001, p. 2).  
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The second hypothesis therefore suggests that monitoring measures and 
mechanisms to ensure bureaucrats’ accountability positively influence policy 
effectiveness.  
 
To conclude, a tension between apparently contradictory hypotheses still 
informs the literature on the link between bureaucracies and state 
effectiveness (Hopkin & Rodríguez-pose, 2007; Hopkin, 2002). The article’s 
remainder will explore the extent to which these different hypotheses help 
explain the case of public investment management in Turkey. 
 
 
3. State and policy effectiveness traditions in Turkey 
 
The state’s commitment to developmentalism is written in the Supreme Law. 
Article 166 of the 1982 Constitution explicitly calls for public policies to tackle 
developmental imbalances via a ‘speedy, balanced, and harmonious 
development of industry and agriculture throughout the country’(TGNA, 
1982). The 1963 saw the foundation of the State Planning Organisation (Devlet 
Pılanlama Teşkilatı, SPO hereafter), transformed in 2011 into the Ministry of 
Development, an organization in charge of managing, supervising, and 
overall coordinating at the central level the country’s public development 
policies (Eraydın, 2000). Since then, the SPO has been in charge of preparing 
multiannual development plans highlighting the priorities and strategies of 
all Ministries and other public agencies. Plans are then implemented through 
annual programmes and annual investment programmes, respectively 
detailing out annual policy priorities and public investment budgetary 
allocations. Figure 1 compares the shares of public gross fixed capital 
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investment as a percentage of GDP in Turkey and in the EU27. Along with the 
shift from a state-oriented to a more market-oriented development model, the 
public investment share has more than halved during the last 25 years. Yet, it 
is still significantly higher than in the EU countries.   
 
Figure 1. Shares of public gross fixed capital investment in Turkey and in the 
EU27, 1985-2010  
 
Source: Own elaboration on data from Turkey’s Ministry of Development, Eurostat. 
 
In spite of the Turkish state’s commitment to a developmental agenda, a 
significant amount of scholars has nonetheless pointed to the existence of a 
frequent gap between goals and concrete implementation (Gezici & Hewings, 
2004) across many policy areas. Particularly since the transition to a multi-
party democracy in 1945, the process of Turkish modernisation became 
increasingly mired in strategies of political populism, clientelism, and 
patronage. Research conducted by sociologists and political scientists has 
extensively documented the pervasive influence of clientelism and patronage 
networks over the use of state goods (Güneş-Ayata, 1994a, 1994b; Heper & 
Keyman, 1998; Sayarı, 1977). As stressed by Barkey (1990), the big loser in this 
process was the state, which was progressively deprived of its ability to 
produce coherent policies. Almost three decades ago Heper explained this 
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process by arguing that: 
 
[D]evelopments prompted the political parties to capture the state by 
their co-ideologists. Also, particularly from 1973 on, what Kalayıcıoğlu 
calls ‘amoral partyism’ increased by leaps and bounds. From 1973 to 
1980 Turkey was governed by coalition governments. As this writer 
has pointed out elsewhere, the coalition members were each heavily 
engaged in unrestrained patronage and nepotism […]. Each ministry 
was brought under the complete jurisdiction of a political party as if 
each ministry had been ‘appropriated’ by a particular political party 
(Heper, 1985, pp. 114, 115). 
 
The weakening of public institutions vis-à-vis the political realm – the 
government in particular – reached its peak in the 1980s and 1990s. As a 
reflection of the changing balance of powers between the bureaucracy and the 
executive (Heper, 1989, 1990), the significance and quality of Development 
Plans decreased significantly (Sezen, 2001). The unsustainability of the 1980s 
and 1990s’ populist and clientelistic drifts reached its limits with the burst of 
the 2001 economic crisis, which forced the politicians and the public at large 
to reconsider the ongoing trajectory (Bakır, 2009; Önis, 2003; Uğur & Yankaya, 
2008). The devastating impacts of the crisis triggered a complete political 
change in the 2002 elections, and the adoption of many landmark public 
administration reforms. Such reforms were pushed through a small group of 
top bureaucrats who, with the support of the World Bank, the IMF, and the 
EU, had been trying to advocate for change since 1995 (Börzel & van Hüllen, 
2014; Özdemir-Tsarouhas, 2013). As a former manager from the Treasury 
recollects: 
 
The mentality of the bureaucracy in the 2000s was very much shaped 
Do bureaucracies enhance or constrain policy effectiveness? 
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by the economic crises. This created a synergy between the SPO, the 
Treasury and the Ministry of Finance. [Bureaucrats] managed to come 
together and create a letter of intent. Bureaucracy championed change. 
[…] Erdoğan found the reforms proposals in a golden tray. (Interview 
number 1).  
 
The Law number 5018 on Public Financial Management and Control 
approved in 2003 drastically restructured the functioning of the entire public 
finance management, replacing the system in operation since 1927 (Özdemir-
Tsarouhas, 2013). The new law incorporates the principles of fiscal 
transparency and bureaucratic accountability, as well as strengthens pre- and 
post-spending control mechanisms for fiscal authorities at all levels.4 While 
the reforms reshaped the Turkish public financial management’s legislative 
framework, not enough is known about the extent to which these novelties 
have been translated into concrete changes.  
 
A recent econometric analysis carried out by Luca and Rodríguez-Pose (2015) 
on the allocation of public investment across the provinces of Turkey during 
2005-2012 unveils a picture in which the allocation of investment does 
respond to short-term criteria, but where the magnitude of electorally-driven 
strategic allocations is relatively low in comparison to the role played by 
socioeconomic drivers of investment. In their analysis, even after controlling 
for distributive politics, socioeconomic disadvantage measures remain more 
relevant predictors of investment. In the light of the significant amount of 
literature stressing the pervasiveness of clientelism, patronage, and 
politicians’ influence over a wider array of Turkey’s state functions, are the 
                                                 
4 At it will become important during the discussion of the empirical results, it is worth stressing 
that the reforms received resistance among numerous quartiers in the bureaucracy (Özdemir-
Tsarouhas, 2013). 
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(relatively) positive results about public investment allocation a proof of an 
effective investment management? Besides, can effectiveness patterns be 
explained by specific institutional characteristics of the bureaucracy in charge 
of investment management? To our best knowledge, almost no studies have 
explored such topic. Interestingly, this literature gap is not only confined to 
the case of Turkey. As Bertelli and Grose (2009) stress, the literature exploring 
how politicians strategically use public resources has generally been 
legislature centric, in the sense that although it recognizes that allocations are 
made in the byways of bureaucracies, it has mostly focused its attention on 
the role of governments and parliamentarians, and much less on the specific 
role played by bureaucratic agencies. Biddle & Milor (1995) have seminally 
analysed the role of the SPO in determining the effectiveness of investment 
incentives to the private sector. Apart from their seminal contribution, yet, no 
research has ever explored the link between the organisation and the 
effectiveness of public investment. 
 
 
4. Methodology 
 
The methodology is based on qualitative techniques. The fieldwork was 
conducted between October and December 2014 in Turkey’s central economic 
bureaucracy. The research findings draw on elite, in-depth semi-structured 
interviews.5 The interviewees’ were selected integrating purposive and chain 
sampling techniques. First, officers occupying positions relevant for the 
project cycle were contacted. Each of them was then asked to provide further 
                                                 
5 Four of the interviews were conducted during a pilot research phase between October 2012 
and September 2013.   
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contacts. A snowball selection of potential interviewees was hence nested into 
the initial purposive sampling. The final sample includes 32 interviewees, of 
which 18 civil servants from the Ministry of Development, and 14 individuals 
from other organisations, namely six civil servants from the Ministry of 
Finance, three key public policy scholars from Bilgi University, Boğazici 
University, and Koç University, two experts from the Delegation of the EU to 
Turkey, one retired manager from the Undersecretary of Treasury, one public 
finance expert and director from Turkey’s Economic Policy Research 
Foundation (Turkiye Ekonomi Politikalari Arastirma Vakfi, TEPAV) with 
previous experience at the Undersecretary of Treasury, and one expert from 
the Ministry of Transport’s General Directorate for Highways (Karayolları 
Genel Mudurluğu, KGM).   
 
In the selection of interviewees, the Ministry of Development was targeted 
preferentially because the organisation holds the main responsibilities for the 
coordination of public investment and regional policies. Since the 1980s, along 
with significant transformations in its economy (Çokgezen, 2000), the country 
has taken progressive steps towards an incipient decentralisation. The 
opening of accession negotiations to the EU, in the early 2000s, in particular, 
coincided with – and partly triggered – a series of reforms in the country’s 
development strategies (Dedeoğlu, 2010). Reforms included the creation of 
development agencies (Lagendijk, Kayasu, & Yaşar, 2009), as well as the 
decentralization of some powers to Provinces, Metropolitan Municipalities 
and Municipalities (Özcan & Turunç, 2008). 
 
In spite of such changes, public investment is still planned, allocated and 
monitored at the central level by the Ministry of Development. Local 
administrations can invest autonomously from Ankara. Yet, around 90% of 
their investment is still covered by the central investment budget. While 
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public investment projects are proposed and operationally managed by line 
Ministries, the definition of annual priorities and guidelines, and the project 
selection and monitoring are still prerogative of the Ministry of Development. 
We hence focused our main attention on the latter organisation on the ground 
that it is exactly the place where policies are developed.  
 
The inclusion of interviewees from external organisations was foreseen to 
customarily cross-validate the correctness of information. The EU Delegation 
to Turkey, TEPAV, and the key scholars were selected because of their 
authoritative and independent view on the state bureaucracy. The Ministry of 
Finance and the Undersecretary of Treasury should be a further source of 
critical information, particularly considering the traditional power and 
coordination problems (Nicholson-Crotty, 2005) they experienced with the 
Ministry of Development.6 Interviews lasted on average between 60 and 90 
minutes, and were carried out in English and Turkish. 
 
Interview findings were also coupled with secondary document collection, 
which added considerably to the factual understanding of the public 
investment management, and served to cross-check the findings from the 
Ministry of Development. Particular attention was paid to three institutional 
sources: the annual reports prepared by the European Commission to monitor 
Turkey’s progress towards accession to the EU, the annual Economic Surveys 
on Turkey prepared by the OECD, and the Five-Year Development Plans and 
the Annual Investment Programmes prepared by the Ministry of 
Development. 
 
                                                 
6 In line with the key role played by the Ministry of Development in the project cycle, Section 5 
will mostly present and discuss quotes from the organisation’s personnel. The quotes presented 
are the ones which were confirmed most frequently – directly and indirectly – by the 
‘interviewees’ control group’ and by external sources. 
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Figure 2. The composition of the interviewees’ sample (percentages, clockwise)  
 
 
Two analytical caveats must be taken into account. First, it is important to 
bear in mind that the analysis does not claim to conclusively map Turkey’s 
public investment policy process. The complete understanding of 
policymaking would require an extensive exploration of not only the 
bureaucratic organisation (the agent), but also the politicians (the principal) 
and the overall public financial framework. Improving state effectiveness 
indeed requires not only an effective bureaucracy able to design and 
implement development-friendly policies, but also political willingness as 
well as fiscal capacity to promote them. Given the very limited amount of 
research on the topic, such a broad subject would nonetheless be out of the 
scope of the current research. More modestly, the article’s aim is to provide 
novel empirical evidence on the concrete functioning of the public investment 
project cycle during the last decade, and then link the observed strengths and 
weaknesses to the institutional characteristics of the Ministry of Development. 
Relatedly, the analysis does not explore how governance links between the 
central state and sub-national levels (potentially) shape the project cycle. 
Although sub-national tiers of government do not play a major role in 
Turkey’s public investment project cycle, further research in that area could 
perhaps provide insightful results. This point gains relevance considering 
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how the lack of coordination between central and sub-national decision units 
has been discussed as a problem in the literature (cf. Karadağ, Deliktaş, & 
Önder, 2004).  
 
A second caveat relates to the interviews. The ability to receive reliable and 
honest answers may be potentially limited by the author’s status as an 
outsider. This may be particularly relevant in a social context such as Turkey, 
where interpersonal trust plays a role bigger than formal ties in shaping 
insider/outsider dynamics. Interviewees were hence accessed after having 
secured the support of trusted individuals who could ‘warrant’ the 
interviewer’s trustworthiness. Previous work experience in the country and 
the use of Turkish in communication further helped ‘breaking into the 
bureaucratic black box’. Considering both the bureaucratic ranking of some of 
the interviewees and sensitivity of the questions being asked, interviews were 
not recorded.7 Last but not least, interviewees were guaranteed anonymity in 
order to encourage ‘free speech’. Overall, these precautions increased 
respondents’ eagerness to talk and discuss personal and institutional conflicts 
more freely. Interviewees were also asked to provide information on their 
most-followed media outlets. Such information was then used to ‘control’ for 
respondents’ heterogeneous political views – which may influence answers 
about the bureaucracy/politics relationship. 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Such decision was taken after running some pilot interviews, where respondents did not accept 
to be recorded. Since 2013, and following a massive corruption scandal involving Turkey’s 
former Prime Minister and other members of the Cabinet, the Government has significantly 
increased pressure on civil servants and worked to purge thousands of suspected political 
enemies from the judiciary and the police (Meyersson & Rodrik, 2014). We hence decided not to 
record any of the final interviewees to avoid potential influences on some of the responses. 
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5. Empirical analysis 
5.1 The public investment project cycle 
 
Following the approval of Law 5018/2013, the public investment project cycle 
is formally based on the three pillars of strategic planning, performance-based 
budgeting, and monitoring and evaluation of results. The Ministry of 
Development’s key project cycle responsibilities include the preparation of 
the annual project guidelines, the screening and approval of projects, as well 
as their overall coordination and monitoring and evaluation. By contrast, the 
empirical implementation of investment projects is carried out by line 
Ministries.   
 
The selection of annual projects is based on a three-step process. The Ministry 
of Development first issues a circular directed to other state agencies and line 
ministries stating each year’s specific objectives. Such circular should mirror 
the strategic priorities set in the Five-year and Medium-term Plans. The latter, 
which cover three years and is annually prepared on a rolling basis, was one 
of the key innovations introduced by the new law. It was foreseen to 
overcome the traditional lack of coordination between multiannual plans and 
annual investment decisions. At least in theory, medium-term plans should 
now guide the selection of investment projects to ensure a more strategic use 
of public monies. Second, bureaucratic agencies and public institutions 
submit their programme proposals to the Ministry of Finance and the 
Ministry of Development, in charge of ensuring that projects comply with 
fiscal and planning documents respectively. A phase of negotiation then 
occurs between other line ministries and the Ministry of Development’s 
                                                                                                                 Davide Luca 
            
19 
experts, before the latter agency finalises the investment programme. As the 
following quotes suggest the procedure is, at least in theory, very technical:   
 
Experts look at project proposals and negotiate with their counterparts. 
Then a meeting is organised at the Ministry of Development. It’s a 
technical level meeting, sector by sector. These meetings last from 
August to September. In the whole Ministry, there may be more than 
100 meetings. From line ministries there is staff attending not only 
from Strategy Departments, but also operational people. The final 
phase is the approval. Experts at the Ministry of Development put 
forward the proposals which they believe need approval. […] Such list 
of proposals then goes to the Director General. Only big issues are 
brought to upper levels e.g. controversial projects. (Interview number 
21). 
 
Of course politicians propose projects, but we can try to convince them 
that hospitals are not needed where there are already four. We are 
strongly working at reducing inequalities in hospital provision across 
Turkey. Of course there are demands for useless hospitals, but we can 
frequently manage to reject unnecessary projects. E.g. two years ago 
we came together with the Ministry of Health. We defined priorities 
areas, allocating each of the 29 health regions of Turkey to one of four 
‘urgency groups’. Frequently our Minister and our General Managers 
have backed up our positions. (Interview number 26). 
 
Programmes are subsequently approved by the High Planning Council 
(Yüksek Pılanlama Kuruluşu, HPC hereafter). The annual investments’ draft 
programme eventually needs to be ratified by the Parliament. The investment 
project cycle is developed in a way to limit the direct influence of legislators 
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(Wehner, 2010). As a matter of fact, Members of Parliament are unable to see 
the projects’ detailed figures. In other words, before the final publication of 
annual investment programmes, parliamentarians can only express their 
views on the budget (and the related investment programme) as a whole 
since the detailed project allocation is not disclosed. Because of such 
mechanism, changes introduced by the Parliament have often been minor 
(Özdemir-Tsarouhas, 2013), hence limiting the influence of individual 
legislators in seeking pork-barrelling allocations. The system is based on the 
idea that legislators can monitor the bureaucracy’s past performance (i.e. 
assessing previous years’ plans), and yet are prevented from influencing 
forthcoming programmes.  
 
Overall, the new system has modernised the investment cycle in line with 
international standards (OECD, 2004). Nevertheless, empirical evidence also 
suggests that the project cycle continues – at least in part – to be marred by 
two main types of flaws. 
 
First, the system has traditionally suffered from inadequate targeting and a 
lack of focus on the most relevant priorities. In spite of the reforms, the link 
between annual investment programmes and multiannual plans continues to 
be weak. As a matter of fact, after just a few years since their first appearance 
in 2006, Medium-term Programmes have started to be published weeks after 
projects had already been proposed by public agencies and selected by the 
Ministry of Development. The consequence is that strategic planning 
continues to be inadequate, with projects still being proposed and discussed 
without clear overall strategies. The following excerpt explains this issue: 
 
A problem is that there are too many plans/documents. There are the 
Five Year Development Plans, the Medium Term Programmes, the 
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Annual Programmes and Investment Programmes, and each Ministry 
has its own plan. All these documents were created to ensure a good 
coordination and good strategic planning, but they are too many now 
and are not respected. (Interview number 1).  
 
Second, weak monitoring and ex-ante feasibility controls leads to inefficient 
projects. As the Eight Development Plan suggested, “even completed 
promptly, they [projects, A./N.] may not yield the anticipated benefits due to 
the insufficiencies in feasibility projects. […] Insufficiencies in monitoring as 
well as evaluation both restrain timely determination and elimination of 
breakdowns and curtail coordination among projects” (State Planning 
Organisation, 2001, p. 226/227). This flaw is caused both by the insufficient 
procedures to carry out effective ex-ante controls by the Ministry of 
Development, and by the poor quality of feasibility studies submitted by 
public institutions to the Ministry. The following quote by a senior manager 
explains the second problem: 
 
According to the Law 5018, you have to have a feasibility study 
analysing technical and financial feasibility, social impacts, etc. What is 
concretely the quality of those studies is another thing. I can show you 
one. This, I can read it in 15 minutes, and it does not say anything. Yet, 
if you tell the Ministry of Transport that a study is wrong, they have 
always answers [to put the project forward]. (Interview number 17).   
 
The weaknesses in the availability of effective mechanisms to ex-ante evaluate 
projects at the selection phase is mirrored by an almost complete lack of on-
going and ex-post monitoring and evaluation of approved projects. 
Numerous interviewees acknowledged such shortcomings as significant 
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constraints on the agency’s performance. Indeed, a Ministry of Development 
manager explains:   
 
I think this is the weakest part of our project cycle. Sometimes we ask 
for realisations, we also carry out some site visits. We do some 
monitoring but we are not good in evaluation. There is no formal 
evaluation. If we did, it would have a big influence on project 
effectiveness. So now we continue making the same mistakes. 
(Interview number 21).  
 
To conclude, the analysis provides an overall picture of the investment project 
cycle in line with Luca and Rodríguez-Pose's (2015) relatively positive 
findings. The good governance reforms implemented in the early 2000s 
appear as a first explanatory variable behind the limited amount of 
distributive politics uncovered by the two authors. Such reforms have 
strengthened both the country’s fiscal situation and the investment project 
cycle. At the same time, the latter still shows important flaws. The following 
two sections will discuss how the levels of policy effectiveness observed can 
be explained by the role and characteristics of the Ministry of Development. 
 
 
5.2 Bureaucratic capacity, autonomy, and policy effectiveness 
 
Unlike other developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America which 
achieved independence from colonial rule with relatively low state capacity, 
coming into existence in 1923 the Republic of Turkey inherited a strong state 
tradition from the Ottoman Empire (Heper, 1985). At the same time, the weak 
independence of state institutions from the ruling elite has been one enduring 
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characteristic of the Turkish state. Within this tradition, the SPO was 
statutorily designed by the military rulers as an organisation comparatively 
stronger and better insulated than most other Turkish public agencies. A 
senior manager explains: 
 
Our position was unique within the public administration. Why? It 
was considered that the institution had to think freely and had to find 
solutions for the future of the country. So they don’t have to be 
directed by plagiarized people [people not independent from special 
and short-term interests, A./N.]. (Interview number 2).  
 
As Özbudun and Ulusan (1980) stress, the military junta was rather 
sympathetic to the concept of planning and the idea of an independent 
organism aimed not merely at the physical growth of the nation, but also at a 
peaceful transformation of the existing systems. Since the 1980s, along with 
the shift from an import-substitution to an export-oriented model of growth 
and the progressive trend of decentralization occurred in Turkey (Özcan & 
Turunç, 2008), the overall state’s active role in development started declining. 
Yet, the SPO overall managed to maintain its elitist character and, with it, 
levels of technical capacity comparatively higher than many other state 
institutions. The public employees’ insufficient skills level has traditionally 
been a problem for the effective provision of public services in Turkey (State 
Planning Organisation, 2006). The peculiar place occupied by the Ministry of 
Development within the broad public sector can be hence grasped comparing 
the organisation’s human resources with other public agencies. Table 1 
compares the educational attainments of civil servants in the Ministry of 
Development to four other state organisations. If compared to the 1980s and 
1990s (Biddle & Milor, 1995), the gap in educational attainments between the 
Ministry of Development and rest of the economic bureaucracy has currently 
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decreased. Nevertheless, the table still shows noteworthy differences. The 
Ministry of Development fares in particular better than its counterparts in the 
highest levels of educational attainments, with almost 32% of its staff 
possessing a graduate degree or a higher diploma, as opposed to less than 
25% in the Treasury, 21% in the Ministry of Economy, and only 6.5% in the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Security, and 3.2% in the Ministry of Finance. 
 
Table 1. Distribution of personnel across different Ministries according to 
educational status in 2014 (percentage) 
Institution Educational attainments 
  
Elementary 
school 
Secondary 
school 
Associate 
degree 
Undergrad. 
degree 
Graduate 
degree 
PhD 
Ministry of 
Development 1.5 6.5 8.8 51.5 28.5 3.2 
Treasury 1.7 11.6 8.3 53.7 22.7 2.2 
Ministry of Economy 3.0 12.0 8.0 56.0 21* 
Ministry of Finance 3.5 14.5 10.7 68.1 3.1 0.1 
Ministry of Labour 
and Social Security 2.4 10.6 8.1 73.4 5.7 0.8 
*Data include both Graduate and higher qualifications. Source: Ministry of Development, 
Ministry of Finance, Treasury, Ministry of Labour and Social Security. 
 
Interestingly, the Ministry of Development has also traditionally given 
emphasis to the ‘socialization’ of new recruits to its ‘institutional norms’ by 
pairing junior experts to senior staff for long periods, as well as by supporting 
logistically and financially members of staff in the achievement of graduate 
degrees in top foreign universities. The following excerpt by one head of 
department confirms how ‘socialisation’ into the organisational structure is 
considered as a key characteristic of the Ministry: 
 
I think that highly trained personnel are more prone to resist against 
political pressure from above. […] I think that compared to the initial 
selection, more important is the training of personnel. Here new people 
are well trained. Each new assistant expert is assigned to an expert. In 
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other ministries, there may be 10 new people for each expert. So they 
don’t learn the institutional culture. (Interview number 16).  
 
Traditionally, the Ministry has also benefitted from a relatively objective and 
meritocratic system of recruitment, which guaranteed the selection of 
competent applicants, as well as from salaries significantly higher than other 
line institutions. As will be discussed later, the organisation has not been 
immune from nepotism and the preferential hiring of candidates based on 
political views, particularly since the 1980s. At the same time, however, most 
interviewees agreed on how the agency has managed not to fully undermine 
the quality of new recruits. The following quote by a senior planning expert 
provides an example: 
 
For promotions in top management of course there is political 
interference. [As for lower positions], if there are two applicants for a 
position, they may prefer the [politically] closest one. But if there is just 
one applicant, they generally will give the job to him. (Interview 
number 7).  
 
When asked why the formal recruitment system has allowed keep nepotism 
(torpillik) relatively at bay in the Ministry, one head of department answered: 
 
The [entry] examination is done by people from here. We work on 
candidates, and then give a list and the Minister selects among our list. 
[…] Of course pressure on this kind of thing is always there. But […] 
we are the ones frying in the pan eventually. I will be the one to work 
until 9 in the evening. So it is in our interest to hire the best people. 
(Interview number 20).  
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The quote confirms the importance of ‘internal control’ as a mechanism for 
the reproduction of ‘institutional quality’, in line with Rauch (1995)’s 
theoretical framework. Marrying the Weberian state hypothesis to a principal-
agent model, he argues that, in a bureaucracy overall effective in fulfilling its 
mission, each manager will have incentives to act as a principal and select and 
supervise his/her staff  (i.e. agents) to ensure that they carry out their tasks. 
Relatedly, the literature suggests how two other mechanisms are important 
for ensuring an agency effective working. The first one concerns whether 
career advancements are based on merit, rather than on other non-
performance related factors. The second mechanism refers to the emphasis 
given to internal advancement over the selection of external candidates. 
Evans (1995) and Rauch (1995) extensively argue how, in settings where 
political pressure on appointments is high, civil service protection 
mechanisms are likely to be efficiency-enhancing. The following quote by a 
young head of department supports their hypothesis:  
 
The Ministry of Development is not the Ministry of Agriculture, or the 
one of Interior. The latter is the most political place on earth. There if 
you do something the top people don’t like, you are hanged. We are 
not a Weberian bureaucracy either. Yet, what we have is we still get 
promoted from within. […]Appointments are most of the time 
objective up to the level of Director General. Then they have to be 
supporters of the party. But even then they must have some capacity. 
In a normal Ministry, if you want to get appointed you go to the 
Minister, or to MPs. […]. The culture here normally doesn’t work like 
that. (Interview number 6).  
 
Indeed, out of the current 15 top managers of the Ministry (Minister, Vice-
Minister, Undersecretaries and General Directors), only two do not have 
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spent their entire professional life within the organisation before being 
appointed to their current position.  
 
Overall, the evidence seems to suggest that existence of a capable institution 
with purposive authority in charge of investment management has positively 
contributed to ensuring that investment decisions remain focused on 
publicly-oriented goals. At the same time, and in spite of institutional 
characteristics comparatively stronger than the rest of Turkey’s bureaucracy, 
the analysis also suggests that concrete mechanisms through which the 
Ministry of Development operates have not been immune from flaws. The 
remainder of this section will explore how the organisation has in particular 
suffered from insufficient autonomy from the executive in carrying out its 
activities.  
 
Since the bureaucratic elite played a key role in the modernization of the 
country, high-level bureaucrats traditionally formed a distinct group united 
by a sense of shared identity (Biddle & Milor, 1995) and frequently perceived 
themselves as the main formulator of the Turkish state’s long-term interests 
(Heper, 1985). At the same time, however, such powers and elitist attitude 
spread the seeds for their own demise, bringing the top bureaucracy into a 
long-term conflict with the political elite. During the 1980s, in particular, non-
legal political pressure on personnel started to creep into the SPO via the 
recruitment of new staff through a separate process to bypass the formal 
examination. A senior expert from TEPAV points out: 
 
In Turkey, this has always been a problem, especially in the 1980s and 
1990s. So bureaucracy tried to safeguard itself [by trying to retain as 
much as independence as possible]. The Undersecretary of Treasury is 
an example. (Interview number 4).  
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Similarly to many other countries (cf. for example the Italian case described 
by Golden, 2003), Turkish politicians have indeed frequently used the 
expansion of the state as an opportunity to engage with patronage 
recruitment. Aside from its budgetary effects, the expansion of personnel has 
had implications on the organisation’s implementation capacity (World Bank, 
1997). Numerous interviewees stressed such problem, arguing that the 
excessive increase in the number of new personnel hired has – particularly in 
recent years – jeopardized the agency’s capacity of ‘socialising’ new recruits. 
As a head of department explains:  
 
In the past our salary regime was higher than other institutions. So we 
were selected as the cream of the available personnel. […] There are 
still residuals of that culture. But in the last 10 years we hired too many 
people, so it is difficult to transmit these values to new people. […] 
Why were people hired? That is political! (Interview number 2).  
 
Besides, while there are mechanisms to ensure a relative insulation from the 
legislative, the organisation is not fully independent from the Government. 
This should be no surprise considering that the SPO was statutorily designed 
as an advisory organisation attached to the Prime Ministry. Institutional 
changes in the project cycle have nonetheless altered, throughout the decades, 
the scope of the bureaucrats’ ability to make their voice heard by the 
government. As many interviewees suggest, a main locus where technical 
decisions are overruled is the High Planning Council. While initially 
composed of the Prime Minister, 4 Ministers, and 4 top managers from the 
SPO, following the Decree Law no. 223/1984 and Law no. 304/1987 
bureaucrats have been removed from the Council. Since then, the 
Government has had full power to modify investment plans prepared by the 
bureaucracy. The Eight Development Plan indeed points out to this 
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phenomenon as one of the structural problems of the public investment 
management, stating how “additional allocation practices within the program 
year mar program discipline and sectorial balances.” (State Planning 
Organisation, 2001, p. 227). The following excerpt provides a concrete 
example: 
 
As experts, our basic document in the selection of projects is the annual 
development programme. […] If you read page 236 of the 2014 
programme, you understand that we should not invest at all in 
motorways but invest in other means of transport. But in the last years 
there have been 70 trillion TL investments in motorways. We allocate 4 
trillion at the beginning of the year, and at the end they have become 9. 
[So how does it happen?] At the High Planning Council. If a project is 
above 100 million TL we send the project to it. We send reports saying 
that projects are good/bad, giving technical opinions. […] Yet, so far, I 
cannot remember even one case when they rejected a project after our 
evaluation. At the end, unless you get politicians away from populist 
approaches, all the ideas about effective planning rest on paper. 
(Interview number 25).  
 
The main channel of ‘control’ of the principal (the political agents) over the 
agent (the bureaucrats)’s policy decisions is hence not the Parliament and its 
sectorial committees (cf. Weingast & Moran, 1983) but, rather, the Prime 
Minister and the Cabinet (cf. Moe & Wilson, 1994). The top bureaucrats’ 
stronger role into the HPC was initially foreseen by the Military interim 
government which established the SPO in the 1960s. According to the 
literature on democratic accountability discussed earlier on, the substitution 
of top-bureaucrats with elected Ministers may mark a positive transition 
towards a more accountable and democratic system. At the same time, 
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however, in a setting where politicians have frequently embraced inefficient 
and unsustainable policies purely aimed at garnering votes, the changing 
balance of power between bureaucrats and politicians within the Council has 
had implications for the sound management of public funds.  
 
Indeed, over the years a number of economically dubious investment projects 
have been burdening the public investment portfolio. As Gönenç, Leibfritz, 
and Yılmaz (2005) suggest these projects were often launched in response to 
central and local political pressures. Examples include the launching of 
irrigation projects with particularly long completion, and the construction of 
transport infrastructures with limited use. This drifts worsened in periods 
such as the 1990s, when the political system was more unstable and political 
leaders engaged more deeply in short-term electorally-motivated allocations. 
Figure 3 confirms such trend. It shows the average number of projects 
included each year in the annual investment programme between 1992 and 
2014, as well as the average completion time of projects (for the years 
available). The number of projects included into each year’s programme 
peaked in the mid-1990s, to start decreasing only in the early 2000s.   
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Figure 3. Number of total investment projects included in each annual programme 
(left axis), and average completion rate of projects (right axis) (1992-2014) 
 
Source: Own elaboration on data from Turkey’s Ministry of Development. 
 
Following the late 1990s and early 2000s political and economic crisis, the 
State Planning Organisation was assigned in 2001 the task of identifying the 
least efficient projects and prepare an investment rationalisation programme. 
Such programme proposed to freeze those projects with the lowest prospects 
of completion, and concentrate the limited resources on priority areas. Under 
the loom of new crises, and willing to comply with the EU accession 
negotiations, the government followed these recommendations (OECD, 2004). 
Evidence hence suggests that Luca and Rodríguez-Pose (2015)’s positive 
results for the period 2005-2012 are driven by the Ministry of Development’s 
capacity, but also contingent on the AKP government’s willingness to 
implement and follow the post-2001 reforms developed by the bureaucracy in 
concert with the World Bank, the IMF, and the EU. The following quote by 
one of the bureaucrats involved in the rationalisation of the project cycle 
supports this claim:   
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Fiscal control gave us opportunities during the management of this 
government. […] Of course [in the past the system] was not working 
because of political interferences. Actually I think [the system] worked 
in the 1960s, in the 1970s, and in a way still the 1980s because of the 
preferences of Ozal’s government. But in the 1980s it started to decline 
and of course went down in the 1990s. There was a chance in the 2000s. 
Actually it was going pretty well until 2008… (Interview number 2).  
 
Pressure to pass investment projects primarily motivated to garner votes 
derives not only from external actors, but also from part of the top-
management within the organisation. The fact that politicians increasingly 
managed to influence bureaucratic recruitment and promotion patterns in 
turn increased the sensitivity of top bureaucrats to signals emanating from the 
political class (Biddle & Milor, 1997). The following quote explains this 
phenomenon: 
 
We are different than other ministries, but it happens that we feel the 
pressure, that we are said ‘this is a key project, if we don’t accept it that 
will be an issue’. If we write very negative and strong assessment 
reports we would put politicians in a difficult corner, so this leads us to 
write reports in a more nuanced and softer way. [Who tell you?] It’s 
top managers. They may tell that ‘this is a key project. I know it’s not 
economically feasible but it’s “socially” viable.’ […]There is closeness 
(samimiyet) between top bureaucrats at the SPO and people in the 
political sphere. (Interview number 25).  
 
Along with the strong power of the Government to influence investment 
decisions irrespective of the technical project cycle, a final factor undermining 
the technical management relates to inadequate staffing within the Ministry 
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of Development. Pointing to the road network projects within the transport 
sector, which for example in 2013 accounted for more than three billion 
Turkish Lira worth of projects, one junior manager explains:  
 
Formally there is no space for political pressure. The procedure is 
formally very technical. Do you ask me if it concretely works? Check 
how many people work on each sector: on road projects there are only 
three people working. This implicitly politicizes the process. (Interview 
number 23).  
 
To conclude, the analysis suggests that although still in a better position than 
other institutions, the Ministry has not been immune from flaws, particularly 
related to insufficient autonomy vis-à-vis the government. Overall, results 
confirm Biddle and Milor (1995), who argued that it is less the absence of 
bureaucratic capacity than the lack of bureaucratic insulation to undermine 
Turkey’s development policies effectiveness. 
 
 
5.3 Bureaucratic accountability and policy effectiveness 
 
The final research hypothesis suggests that while bureaucratic autonomy may 
reduce politicians’ attempts to drive the policy process towards inefficient 
and clientelistic outcomes, effective devices to monitor bureaucrats’ actions 
are nonetheless expected to be an important component to reduce moral 
hazard among civil servants (Page, 2010). Interestingly, empirical results 
suggest that the very limited existence of mechanisms to ensure 
accountability – another significant flaw in Turkey’s investment project cycle 
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– is determined not only by factors external to the Ministry of Development, 
but also by resistance to change originating within the organisation.  
 
In spite of the legal novelties introduced by the Law 5018/2003, only an 
extremely limited amount of personnel is currently in charge of monitoring 
and evaluation tasks. One of the interviewees from the Ministry of 
Development in particular suggests how probably only 5 members of staff 
(i.e. around 0.06% of the organisation’s total employees) are concretely 
devoted to the real monitoring and evaluation of projects (Interview number 
7). As a former top manager from the Treasury explains:  
 
The founding of the SPO was done to streamline investments and 
check efficiency. Yet, monitoring and evaluation had always largely 
ignored. In the 1980s and 1990s, in particular, project efficiency was 
low. […] The 2003 laws on public expenditure were an effort to 
rationalize public spending. Yet, nobody knows exactly the outcomes 
of projects. Bureaucratic offices (e.g. units, directorates) publish activity 
reports, but these don’t link to performance indicators. (Interview 
number 1).  
 
Trying to explain the reason why the organisation never gave significant 
priority to monitoring and evaluation, in spite of the awareness of its utility to 
increase effectiveness, Biddle and Milor (1995) reported the opinion of a staff 
member that collecting data on performance would be like ‘playing Russian 
roulette’. Most interviewees provided similar arguments. Interestingly, one 
senior manager suggests how the top management’s focus on the monitoring 
of performance has decreased along the years, rather than increasing: 
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The first big change in the SPO was done in 1994. At that time the 
Coordination Department was closed. […] Our main rule in that 
department was to follow-up the implementation, make necessary 
revisions and coordination, and monitor the realization and make 
necessary reporting. […] We were monitoring all projects’ realisations; 
we were issuing public investment expenditure reports each quarter. 
Now we don’t do that! At that time we were. […] By closing that 
department, those functions were cancelled. (Interview number 2).  
 
Similarly, numerous experts acknowledged that monitoring and evaluation 
has never become a priority for the top management. The same interviewee 
provides a concrete example:  
 
We started a new project. It was initially accepted by the top 
management, it was about ex-post evaluation of selected projects. But 
later the top management said that it was not our priority at the 
moment. (Interview number 2).  
 
Overall, both the interviews’ findings and the policy documents (in particular 
the Eight Development Plan) suggest that monitoring and evaluation 
procedures have been applied unsystematically and lack overall coherence. 
The analysis also points out how the substantial lack of mechanisms aimed at 
ensuring both internal and external accountability has constrained the 
bureaucracy’s commitment to achieve better performance. One of the few 
staff members working on intermediate and ex-post monitoring of projects 
recounts: 
 
There is no standard. There are no shared rules on how to deal with 
numbers. The SPO historically did not have capacity [on this area]. But 
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there has been no interest too. […] Those who are brave, they get 
discouraged. We don’t take the initiative, we are discouraged. [For 
example] we conducted a monitoring and evaluation project with the 
World Bank in 2007-8. It was aimed at introducing monitoring and 
evaluation in annual programmes. There was commitment with the 
World Bank. Our top level signed a commitment with them. We 
wanted people from sectorial departments. But sectorial managers did 
not even attend our meetings regularly. (Interview number 3).  
 
The flaws in the mechanisms aimed at ensuring the agency’s external 
accountability are even more striking. In annual investment programmes, 
projects are recorded with no common classification criteria, so any external 
in-depth analysis on single investments projects is very difficult. Besides, 
project codes between the national budget prepared by the Ministry of 
Finance and the investment programme prepared by the Ministry of 
Development don’t coincide (Yavuz, 2014). As the latter author suggests, this 
is not a casual flaw, but rather a planned expedient to avoid the Parliament 
and the Court of Accounts’ auditing controls. In other words, the bureaucratic 
and political elites effectively have colluded. Interestingly, such collusion 
between top bureaucrats and the government resembles recent evidence put 
forward by Page (2010). Exploring which mechanisms for securing public 
accountability do bureaucrats pay particular attention to when developing 
public policies, he concludes that bureaucrats take significant efforts to make 
sure their political leaders approve their actions. In contrast to conventional 
rational choice and principal-agent frameworks, which stress the potential for 
conflict between bureaucrats and politicians, his findings suggest that the 
incentives for bureaucrats can work entirely in the same direction as the ones 
for politicians. Indeed, as one of the interviewees from the Ministry of 
Development recollects:  
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From a political point of view, this was done to avoid the audit 
function of the parliament. Both the audit system used in Turkey and 
the control of the Court of Accounts (Sayıştay) work on the budget, not 
on the investment programmes. So the system was created to avoid 
control. And from a bureaucratic point of view, the lack of standards 
was beneficial to give more comfort to the top managers. So there was 
connivance between the top bureaucrats and politicians. (Interview 
number 23).  
 
While further research on this area is needed, it is possible to speculate that 
one of the reasons why the parliament never pushed for reforms aimed at 
correcting this flaw might be related to the functioning of political parties. 
Similarly to the case of Mexico explored by Langston (2001), in Turkey party 
leaders have traditionally had strong influence over party members. 
Following the new constitution approved after the 1980s military coup, 
parties’ candidate lists are compiled by leaders, while a national electoral 
threshold of 10% prevents dissidents from separating from their party to form 
a new one. The strong-executive/weak-parliament has therefore been a 
peculiar characteristic of Turkey’s political system (Öniş & Webb, 1992). The 
system induced strong discipline from party members, who had an incentive 
to align with the party leadership, and then reduced dissent among legislators 
against the actions taken by the Government, and the Prime Minister in 
particular. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
Drawing on elite, semi-structured interviews among Turkey’s economic 
bureaucracy, as well as on the analysis of national and international policy 
documents, the research has aimed to answer the following related questions: 
(1) is Turkey’s public investment project cycle currently managed effectively? 
(2) What is the role played by the Ministry of Development – the organisation 
in charge of planning and directing the project cycle, formerly State Planning 
Organisation – in ensuring that investment decisions remain focused on 
publicly-oriented goals, as opposed to purely becoming a tool for 
particularistic redistribution and electoral rewarding? These research 
questions are motivated by the literature which, after almost a century since 
Max Weber's (1921) seminal work on bureaucracies, still discusses how, and 
when, public sector organisations can contribute to effectively providing the 
critical public goods necessary for development. 
In line with the developmental state literature (Amsden, 1989; Evans, 1995; 
Evans et al., 2014; Rauch & Evans, 1999; Wade, 1990), results suggest that the 
Ministry of Development’s nature, comparatively more capable and 
authoritative than many other Turkish public organisations, has positively 
contributed to the sound, technical management of public investment. Results 
also show how the organisation and the project cycle are relatively well 
insulated from individual legislators, but not autonomous vis-à-vis the 
government, and hence the effective management of funds is strongly 
dependent on the political elite’s ‘will to deliver’. Luca and Rodríguez-Pose's 
(2015) results on the limited scope of pork-barrelling allocations in 
contemporary Turkey might hence be contingent to the stable political 
environment of the 2000s and the fiscal reforms implemented following the 
2001 economic crisis. In comparison, in periods such the 1990s, when the 
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political system was ‘in a state of flux’ (Sayarı, 2002), the bureaucracy was 
unable to shield from executives’ pressure and deliver. At the same time, 
however, in line with the democratic accountability literature (Huber et al., 
2001; Niskanen, 2001), the analysis also uncovers significant resistance from 
the bureaucracy against the implementation of reforms which would increase 
the organisation’s efficiency and transparency.  
 
The analysis’ implications for theory and policy are threefold. First, it 
contributes to the literature on distributive politics (cf. Golden & Min, 2013) 
by providing novel insights on how tactical redistribution dynamics in 
contemporary Turkey occur. Empirical evidence indicates that distributive 
politics allocations are mostly determined by the Prime Minister and the 
executive, rather than the legislative. As most interviewees point out, the 
main locus where technical decisions are overruled is the High Planning 
Council, a body composed of the Prime Minister and eight other members of 
the Cabinet. Interestingly, in line with Page (2010) the analysis also uncovers 
the over-sensitivity of part of the top bureaucrats to signals emanating from 
the political class. It is hence not only members of the executive, but also top-
bureaucrats to drive investment decisions towards electoral rewarding. In 
other words, in contrast to conventional rational choice and principal-agent 
frameworks which stress the potential for conflict between bureaucrats and 
politicians, our findings seem to suggest that the incentives for bureaucrats 
can sometimes work in the same direction as the ones for politicians.     
 
Second, results contribute to the debate on how effective public organisations 
should be designed and managed. Findings suggest that effective 
bureaucracies need to strike a balance between the two opposing dimensions 
of bureaucratic autonomy and accountability. As Azulai et al. (2014, p. 8) 
argue, good institutions “need to solve the conflict of interest between 
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bureaucrats and politicians on one side and citizens on the other by providing 
mechanisms for political accountability, guaranteeing that society’s interests 
prevail over bureaucrats’ and politicians’ interests”. If the balance between 
these two dimensions is tipped too far in favour of either of them, 
bureaucracies will face the risk of either becoming too powerful and seek 
rents (as traditionally foreseen by Niskanen, 1971), or to become too weak to 
oppose the use of public goods by politicians (Steelman, 2001) for purely-
strategic goals. Results also suggest how one of the real challenges of 
(regional) development policies is not only to figure out technical solutions 
but also to sort out the political process so that incentives to achieve 
effectiveness arise among politicians and bureaucrats. Such goals can be 
achieved by reforms aimed at de-politicising the civil service, separating the 
political sphere from the administrative tasks, and instil new management 
practices within the public administration (Milio, 2010). Such 
recommendations can also partly apply to local and regional development 
analyses, where there is a lively debate on how to reform inefficient 
institutional settings at the subnational level (cf. Milio, 2007; Rodríguez-Pose, 
2013). 
 
Last but not least, while most countries around the world have progressively 
moved towards an incipient decentralization (Rodríguez-Pose & Gill, 2003), 
results from contemporary Turkey confirm earlier research (Özcan, 2000, 
2006) on the risks of horizontal and vertical decentralization measures carried 
out in absence of a strong and competent state administration. This is not to 
argue against decentralization. Many researchers, both in Turkey and 
elsewhere, have indeed shown the risks linked to overly relying on the central 
state and the lack of grass-root local participation in local and regional 
development programmes (Boulding & Wampler, 2010; Heper, 1992; 
Jaramillo & Wright, 2015), or the risks of wrong policy choices caused by a 
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central planner lacking information about local needs (Dulupçu, 2005; Eder & 
Çarkoğlu, 2005; Eraydın, Köroğlu, Özturk, & Yaşar, 2008). The analysis hence 
does not argue the case for a traditional ‘top-down’ developmental state. Yet, 
results are a reminder of how a capable, shielded from political power, and 
accountable bureaucracy is a prerequisite to limit the problems which 
frequently cause ‘democratic failures’ (Besley, 2006) around the world. As 
suggested by Heper (1992) long ago, Turkey needs reforms aimed at 
increasing democratic participation in the policy process and taxpayers’ 
monitoring over public spending. Reforms which reduce the powers of the 
old top bureaucracy from institutions such as the (former) State Planning 
Organisation, to increase the control by the ruling government will not 
otherwise lead to stronger institutions, but simply produce different – and in 
some ways more pernicious (Meyersson & Rodrik, 2014) – ineffective and 
unsustainable structures. 
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